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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-vs-

Case No. 10279

RAY WAYNE PIERCE,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The appellant has appealed his conviction for the crime
of second degree murder in the Third Judicial District.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged with the crime of murder in
the first degree for the killing of Kenneth Jack Vaught in
Salt Lake City on May 28, 1964. A jury trial in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, resulted in the appellant's conviction for the lesser crime of second degree murder. The appellant was committed to the Utah State Prison
for an indeterminate term.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent State of Utah submits that the conviction
should be affirmed.

2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent State of Utah submits the followincr·~
statement of facts as being a more correct statement of \\hat
the record, in fact, reveals.
On May 28, 1964, the appellant was residing at 462
South 5th East under the name of Ray Ross ( R. 96). On
that day the appellant's friend, the deceased, began sniffing
airplane glue at approximately 12: 00 noon ( R. 260). Sniffing glue results in giving the f ecling of being high or intoxicated (R. 271, 504). The appellant also started to sniff
glue at approximately 4: 00 or 4: 30 p.m. on the 28th of
May ( R. 258), although the amount he consumed up until
the time of the crime is in dispute. At about 4: 00 p.m. the
appellant went to pay a traffic ticket, to buy glue, to a car
mart, and returned at about 6: 30 p.m. ( R. 262). After
appellant returned to his apartment he left again ( R. 263 I.
The appellant returned to his apartment at about 9: 30 p.m.
( R. 266, 515) . According to the statement given police
after the crime, appellant could recall his address, cmplo:ment, schooling, and could recall with some degree of
specificity where he had been from 5: 00 p.m. on the 28th of
May until the murder ( R. 502-511 ) .1
When appellant returned at 9: 00 p.m. he saw the \·ictim,
Kenny Vaught, who was still in his apartment. Vaught \\3'
crying ( R. 266), and according to the appellant's testimony
at trial, the following occurred ( R. 266) :
"A. I guess he was crying. Or he wasn't crying, he
was sad or something. But he told me about thcsr
over him ' \\ hcthcr hr \1·ould
Pe ople that were fiahtinrr
a
a
go with the colored or the white people. And I guess
he wanted me, he wanted me to sec the people. And
1 The statement given police \\as not rccci\·f·cl as ;rn admission hut as stipulated evidence, thus raising it to the same le\ el as tcstilllo!ly ( R. 199) ·
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told me, 'You can't see them with the light. It has got
to be dark.' And so he told me, he told me to go sit in
the corner of the room and tum the light off and he
\\'oulcl sit in the rocking chair. And I says - all right
- and I got up and \\·ent and sat in the comer of the
bed and turned the light off. I'm not sure how long it
\\as bet\\ een the time he told me they were here. He
told me they were here and I jumped up and turned
the light on. And he was scratching at the wall and
told me they went through the wall. And he says I want to try it again. And I said - all right. And so
I got up, I got up on the corner of the bed. And the
next thing I remember I turned the light on and here
was Kenny in the rocking chair bleeding."

In his statement to the police, he said ( R. 510) :
"A. I asked him [Kenny Vaught J what was the
matter, and he says, 'Nothing'; and I kept asking him
what was the matter and he says, 'Nothing'. So he
says, 'All right I'll tell you'; and he says, 'I was sitting
on the edge of the bed here and there was a colored
man sitting in the white rocking chair and I was
talking to him', and he says, 'there was a bunch of
white people and colored people arguing about which
way I should go, colored or white'; and he said he was
dancing with one colored man, and he said he was
dancing the way colored people dance, I don't know
how that is, but he suggested that I get over in the
corner of the bed and that we tum the light out and
he'd sit in the rocking chair and wait and see if they
come back, and then in about ten or fifteen minutes he
jumped up and said, 'They're here' and I jumped up
and turned the light on and he was in the comer
scratching at the wall; and then he says, 'They went
through the wall'; and then he says, 'Let's try it again,
you get back in the corner and turn the light out'; and
I'm not sure, but I think I took my knife out of my
pocket and opened it up."
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The knife had originally been given the appellant by the
deceased ( R. 511 ) . The appellantfurther stated (R. 512):

"Q. Did you believe that there were other people in
the room?
A. Not really, but I don't know what it was.
Q. Now when you turned the light out the second
time, you had the knife in your hand and the blade
was open?
A. Yes.
Q. What happened then?
A. Well, I went over in the corner and waited for
them, and in about no more than five minutes he
jumped up and said, 'They're here' and I don't know
what I did, I refuse to answer that.
Q. Do you recall hearing him stand up?
A. No, I don't.
Q. You don't know whether he stood up or not?
A. No.
Q. But he did state they were there? Then you state
you started stabbing?
A. No, I didn't state that, I remember I had the
knife in my hand and the next thing I know I had the
light on and Kenny was laying in the chair.
Q. How many people were in the room at this time?
A. Just me and Kenny."
The deceased and the appellant were the only two seen in
the room by other tenants (R. 189, 193), and appellant
stated that he didn't believe anyone else was present (R.
512).
The deceased died of a knife wound in the chest (R
142), although he also had stab wounds in the right shoulder, lower right leg and across his nose ( R. 134). The appellant, after the stabbing, threw his knife under the bed,

then retrieved it and put it on the bed (R. 514). He attempted mouth to mouth resuscitation ( R. 514), and then
ran to the neighboring tenants, asking them to get a doctor
and stating, "I killed him. I killed him," or "I stabbed him,"
!R.190, 117, 122, 154,305).
The appellant had, a short time before the killing, indicated that he would kill to get what he wanted, and would
kill the deceased if he had something he wanted (R. 163) .
Appellant admitted making such a statement at trial (R.
285). The deceased's wallet containing about $25 was
found on the appellant after the stabbing (R. 290, 156-159, 471, 288).
The appellant at no time testified that he was stabbing
ghosts, and told the police he did not believe anyone was
actually in the room with him and the deceased, and that he
believed he stabbed the deceased (R. 512, 513) .2 Additionally, at the time of trial, the appellant himself testified
(R. 288):

"Q. Now all of this story about these people coming
through the wall was what Kenny told you, isn't that
true?
A. Yessir.
Q. You never saw them, did you?
A. No sir."
Further, appellant admitted at trial that what he told the
police, about believing others were not in the room, was true
(R. 299). The appellant's defense was based on temporary
'Contrary to the assertions in appellant's brief that appellant was not sure
what had happened, but he was stabbing ghosts (App. Brief, p. 3), the record
at page 518 (T. 444), shows only an attempt to impeach the testimony of a
police officer by that given at preliminary hearing where the officer said
IR. 518):
"When the victim had stated that they were back again he got up
off of the bed and he wasn't sure what happened. He stated that he had
stabbed them; stabbed what he thought was the individuals."
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insanity caused by sniffing airplane glue \\ hich contains a
toxic element, toluene, which has an affect upon the brain.
Mr. William Arbuckle, a toxicologist, testified that the
type of airplane glue used by the deceased and the appellant
contained toluene which can produce irrational beha\·ior
if ingested in sufficient quantity ( R. 221 ) . He also indicated
that many things, such as amount of consumption, period
of time, body metabolism, etc., would affect a person's rfsponse to toluene.
Dr. Alan Done, a pediatrician, who had done considerable research in the field of glue sniffing, noted that partial
amnesia is consistent with toluene intoxication. He noted
that an intensive close could produce a bizarre reaction and
that under such circumstances a person would not ha\·e the
capacity to think in a rational way, could not distinguish
between right or wrong, or control himself ( R. 336). The
doctor noted that there was nothing to show the appellant
acted in response to hallucinations ( R. 344, 349, 351). He
also indicated actual behavior would be the most important
factor in evaluating the extent of toluene influence.
Dr. Robert Mohr, a psychiatrist, felt that such actions.
as testified to by the appellant, would be compatible \\ith
toluene intoxication and that from his examination of thr
appellant, he was of the opinion that the appellant did not
know right from wrong, the nature and quality of his act,
and could not control himself ( R. 383). He fcit such actions of the appellant would be consistent with a dcliriou>
state, but noted that his opinion was not based on any direct
evidence of hallucinations ( R. 431). The doctor was of the
opinion that a person intoxicated by toluene would be suffering from a mental disease ( R. 432, 377). Dr. Lyndon D.
Clark was also of the same opinion that such a reaction to
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toluene could be classed as a disease of the mind ( R. 451).
Dr. Clark \Vas not able to say what dosage would produce
toxic psychosis ( R. 450, 452), noted hallucinations could
come and go ( R. 483) , but, in response to standard questions along the lines of the elements of an insanity defense,
indicated that he did not believe the appellant was re~ponsible ( R. 462) .
Dr. Louis G. Moench, a psychiatrist who examined the
accused, testified that he felt the appellant was sane at the
time of the crime ( R. 466) and merely had a sociopathic
personality. He indicated that the appellant's recounting of
the events was reasonably clear except for the instance of
the stabbing, thus casting doubt on the claim of toxic
amnesia. 3 He was of the opinion that the appellant's taking
the wallet evidenced a sociopathic and criminal response,
that appellant knew right from wrong, could adhere to the
right, and could and did form the required criminal intent
(R. 468, 469, 4 71, 4 72). The doctor did not believe the
appellant participated in the hallucinations experienced by
the deceased ( R. 4 70).
Police officers, Glen S. Cahoon and Gerald A. Durrans,
who saw the appellant immediately after the crime, felt the
appellant, although excited, appeared normal and was
coherent ( R. 494, 495).
Based on the above evidence, the jury returned a verdict
of guilty of murder in the second degree.

'Dr. Mohr also testified that the inability to remember a single instance
would be unusual and incompatible with toluene intoxication (R. 417).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CO!\I!\1IT ERROR I'.\
REFUSING TO GI\'E THE APPELLANTS REQl'ESTED I'.'iSTRUCTIONS ON HALLCCINATIONS AND DELUSIO\S
SINCE:
(a) THE COURTS INSTRUCTIONS ON INSANITY Al\IJ
INTENT WERE SLTFFICIENT.
(b) THE COURTS Il\'STRCCTI02\!S ON INSA'.\'ITY
WERE MORE FAVORABLE TO THE APPELLA\T
THAN THE INSTRLTCTIONS REQL1 ESTED.
(c) THE REQUESTED INSTRCCTIONS WERE CO:\TRARY TO THE BETTER REASONED LEGAL POSITION.
(d) THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT PROPERLY
FRAMED.
(e) THE EVIDENCE \\'AS SPECCLATIVE AND DID NOT
RAISE THE ISSUE.

(a) The appellant contends that the trial court erred
in refusing to give requested Instructions 2, 7 and 11, relating generally to the affect of delusions or hallucinations on
criminal responsibility. It is submitted that there is no merit
to that position. During the course of the trial, appellant''
counsel, in interrogating expert witnesses, consistently referred to the standard tests for the defense of insanity. In
questioning Dr. Alan K. Done, the questions were couched
in form to raise the usual elements of insanity defense (R.
334, 336). With specific reference to whether or not the
appellant committed the crime under the influence of hallucinations, Dr. Done responded as follows (R. 344):

"Q. Nmv - there is nothing with this Defendant
that shows that he had hallucinations, is there?
A. I have heard nothing."
Dr. Robert C. Mohr, a psychiatrist who was also called
by the appellant, \Vas also questioned concerning the mental
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condition of the appellant during the commission of the
crime and responded that in his opinion the appellant could
not appreciate right from wrong, was unable to know the
nature and quality of his act, or to avoid committing the act
(R. 380, 384). Dr. Mohr at one time in his testimony also
indicated that there was no evidence of hallucinations (R.
431). However, after reading the statement the appellant
gave to the police, he seemed to feel that the defendant was
hallucinating (R. 443, 444). Dr. Lyndon D. Clark was also
questioned concerning the appellant's ability to distinguish
right from wrong, adhere to the right, and appreciate the
nature and quality of his act ( R. 462).
The prosecution's rebuttal psychiatrist gave his testimony
in accord with the standard test for insanity in the State of
Utah (R. 464, 469), although differing with appellant's
experts. The appellant's doctors were generally of the
opinion that the appellant's condition could be categorized
as a mental disease (R. 432, 442, 462).
The state of the evidence which was presented to the
jury left them with testimony couched in terms of the usual
insanity defense. In State v. Poulson, 14 U.2d 213, 381 P.2d
93 ( 1963), and State v. Kirkham, 7 U.2d 108, 319 P.2d 859
(1958), this court accepted the elements for the defense of
insanity to be: ( 1 ) Whether the accused understood the
nature and quality of his act; ( 2) could distinguish right
from wrong, and ( 3) could adhere to the right.
The court expressly instructed the jury in accord with
these clements ( R. 525, Instruction 7a). Further, the court
gave detailed and appropriate instructions on the requirement of intent (R. 523, 526, 527, 528).
It is submitted that under these circumstances the instructions requested by the appellant need not have been
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given. It is well settled that where delusions or hallucinations result in criminal conduct which is the product of J
mental disease, the appropriate defense is one of insaniti.
Thus in Morris, et al., Studies in Criminal Law ( 196-t),
at page 62, it is noted:
"* * *Conscious behavior analogous to automatism
is either irrcsistable impulse, or, if hallucinations arc
involved, insanity."
It is difficult to understand how a person could commit a
crime while in a hallucinatory and delusional state and at
the same time appreciate the nature and quality of his act,
and be able to distinguish right from wrong. Sec Williams,
Criminal Law, 2d Ed., The General Part, Sec. 166.
It should be noted that the Af'Naghten case, 10 Clark &
F. 200, 1 C. & K. 130, 8 English Reports 718 (House of
Lords 1843), involved in part the issue of a crime com
mitted under the circumstances of an insane delusion. Sec
Clark and Marshall, Crimes, 6th Eel., pages 342, 369. The
judges in the M'Naghten case responded with the "right
and wrong" test, thus clearly recognizing that the presence
of a delusion or hallucination docs not necessarily affect
the test of insanity.
The rule sometimes said to be applicable when' a cklusionary or hallucinatory condition exists, requiring some
specific type of hallucination, which, if true, would be a
defense to the crime actually committee!, is an ab~urclity.
As is noted in Perkins, Criminal Law, page 755:
"The delusion test is not required as a matter of
logic because whenever disease has forced into the
mind imaginary facts, which cannot br disloclgcd and
•.vhich if real \\Ould justify or excuse what is done, the
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owner of this disordered mind is in no position to discriminate between right and wrong with reference
thereto."
In Keedy, Insanity and Criminal Responsibility, 30
Harvard Law Review 535, 559 ( 1917), it is stated:

"* * * Delusion is a symptom of different varieties
of mental disease and should be considered in connection with the general symptomatology."
In W eihofen, Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law,
pages 71 through 72, it is observed that the historical origin
and basis of some cases recognizing a special rule in the case
of delusion situations is in fact a fallacious delusion of the
courts themselves arising from a misinterpretation of Lord
Erskine's argument in the Hadfield case, 27 Howard State
Trials 1282. Weihofen, supra, also notes that a delusion is
not an independent phenomenon by an external symptom
indicative of a much deeper mental disturbance.
In Ryan v. People, 60 Colo. 425, 153 P. 756 ( 1915), the
Colorado Supreme Court, in rejecting the position that an
insane delusion requires some special judicial treatment,
noted:

"* * * Insanity is a disease of the mind and delusion
is a symptom of the disease."
Further, as is noted in Weihofen, supra, at page 79:

"* * * Whatever justification there may be for
judges' assuming to lay down a legal test of responsibility (which is, after all, a legal and not a medical concept), there is none for the attempt to enunciate from
the bench a general rule for determining whether a
particular belief is symptomatic of mental unsoundness or not."
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The better reasoned cases have clearly recognized that
proper instruction of a jury along the lines of the standard
insanity defense is adequate where delusion or hallucinations are the symptoms indicative of insanity. Parsons v.
State, 81Ala.577, 2 So. 854 ( 1887); Woodall v. State, 149
Ark. 33, 231 S.W. 186 ( 1921); Ryan v. People, supra;
Kraus v. State, 108 Neb. 331, 187 N.W. 895 ( 1922). Thus,
in Ryan v. People, supra, the Colorado Supreme Court
observed:
"A person who is so diseased in mind at the time of
the act as to be incapable of distinguishing right from
wrong \vith respect to it, or being able to so distinguish,
has suffered such an impairment of mind by disease
as to destroy the will power and render him incapable
of choosing the right and refraining from doing- thr
wrong, is not accountable. And this is true howsoe\·er
such insanity may be manifested, by insane delusions
of whatever nature, by irresistible impulse, or other. "
wise.
Consequently, it is submitted where as in the insant case
proper and comprehensive instructions on insanity and
intent were given, there is no need for meaningless instructions relating to delusions or hallucinations.
The appellant contends that State v. Green, 78 Utah 580,
6 P.2d 177 ( 1931), supports his claim. The appellant,
however, does not point out wherein the Green case would
rule that the failure to give instructions on delusions and
hallucinations would be error where instructions on insanit)
were given. Further, the Green case does not stand for the
proposition that such instructions must be given. The court
merely acknowledged that there is a rule of law expressly
relating to insane delusions or hallucinations, citing 16 C.j.,
Section 76. The court then ruled that the evidence in the

13
case before it did not properly raise the issue. It is submitted
that the Green case should not be deemed precedent for the
appellant's position and to the extent that the dicta pronouncement found in that case relating to insane delusions
has effect, it should be rejected. The court in Green did
not thoroughly analyze the cases in the field nor did it determine whether the rule had any validity as against modem
medical knowledge. Further, the court's statement, that it
seems settled that there is a special rule relating to insane
delusions, is totally erroneous. In fact, the great majority of
cases have rejected such a rule. Thus, Weihofen, Insanity
as a Defense in Criminal Law, at page 74, notes:
"This special delusion rule laid down in M'Naghten's
Case, that a person committing an anti-social act by
reason of an insane delusion will not be relieved of
criminal responsibility unless the facts of the delusion
would constitute a defense if true, has never been
accepted in the majority of American states. The
assumption, often made, that this rule has been accorded general acceptance, and must be regarded as
part of the law in most jurisdictions, is without foundation. As we have seen, it is law today in not more than
nine states. On the other hand, it has been expressly
repudiated by the courts of eight jurisdictions, and by
implication in at least nine others, which have held
that the general test of responsibility adopted in the
jurisdiction applies to delusion as to any other manifestation of mental disorder, and that there is no
special test for delusion."
Further, it is apparent that the delusional theory is at best
confusing to the jury where the "right and wrong" instructions are also given. Perkins, Criminal Law, pages 751 to
755. It is obvious, therefore, that the trial court acted
properly in rejecting the instructions requested by the ap-
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pellant since the instructions as given adequately advised
the jury.
(b) It is submitted that additionally the appellant has
no basis to claim prejudice since the instructions on insanity
are more favorable to the appellant than the instructions
requested. Instruction 7, requested by the appellant, attempts to state the minority rule on delusions and is to the
effect that if the defendant admits the commission of a
crime while in a delusional state, he may be acquitted "if
the facts of his delusional belief would provide a defense.''
Thus, under the instruction requested by the appellant, he
may not have known the nature and quality of his act, or
able to adhere to the right, or known that what he was doing
was wrong, but, unless the facts of his hallucination or drlusion would otherwise be reasonable to a sane man, he could
not be acquitted. Therefore, the instruction requested by
the appellant placed upon him an additional burden of
demonstrating that the fact of the hallucination or delusion
would be exculpatory. The absurdity of this position is
manifest and it is obvious that such a requirement imposes
a much greater burden upon the defendant than the instructions given. In Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854
( 1887), the Alabama Supreme Court noted as to such a
concept:
"* * * If he dare fail to reason, on the supposed facts
embodied in the delusion, as perfectly as a sane man
could do on a like state of realities, he receives no
mercy at the hands of the law."
In State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, it was stated with reference
to such a requirement:
"* * * It is, in effect, saying to the jury, the prisoner
was mad when he committed the act, but he did not use
sufficient reason in his madness."
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In 27 C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 60, it is observed, with
reference to the delusional rule:
"***other authorities expressly repudiate this rule
as holding an admittedly insane person to a standard
of morality which should be enacted only of the sane,
and hold that, in the case of partial insanity, an insane
delusion, which raises in the mind of accused an
imagined state of facts and so corrupts his mental
processes that he is incapacitated from distinguishing
ri,ght from wrong with respect to the act charged,
affords a defense, even though the imagined state of
facts, if real, would not have justified a sane man in
doing the same act."
This rule has been said to be an "inhumane rule" when
compared to the A1'Naghten test. Weihofen, supra, Chapter 3. Further, the delusional rule, as contended in Instruction 7, along with the other instructions posed by the appellant, is psychiatrically unsound. See Weihofen, supra,
page 76.
The landmark case in the area and one of the better
analyses of the whole field is found in Kraus v. State, 108
Neb. 331, 187 N.W. 895 ( 1922). In that case the court
determined that instructions, similar to those requested by
the appellant here, where given by the trial court, to be
reversible error. The court felt the appropriate way to
instruct the jury was along the lines of a general insanity
instruction. The court stated:
"* * * Whether or not a person having an insane
delusion, who is impelled to act by reason of that delusion, is able to distinguish the difference between right
and wrong, with respect to his act, it seems to us, must
be determined as a question of fact in each particular
case, and therefore, that the jury must in all cases
where the defense of insanity, either partial or total, is
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presented be required to determine whether or not the
accused, at the time he committed tlw act, understood
its nature and comprehended that it was wrong."
The court noted that generally the rule with reference to
insane delusions is simply another way of stating the grneral rule with regard to the defense of insanity, citing Cunningham v. State, 56 l'v!iss. 269, 21 Am. Rep. 360, op. cit..
p. 898. The court stated, with reference to the requirement
that facts of any delusion be exculpatory, that such a test
was improper. It noted:
"***Whether or not a person suffering from insane
delusions is yet, by reason of his sanity on other subjects, able to distinguish between right and wrong.
with regard to the subject-matter as to which he is
insane, is a question of fact, to be passed upon by the
jury. An instruction, therefore, in a case presenting
the defense of partial insanity, which states that a
person having an insane delusion cannot justify his act
unless the facts imagined, if true, would have justified
a sane man, and leaving out the question as to whether
or not the delusion so perverted and affected the accused's mind as to incapacitate him from determining
whether or not his act is right or wrong, does not sufficiently present the issue to the jury. Ryan v. People,
60 Colo. 425, 153 Pac. 756, L.A.R. 1917F, 646, Ann.
Cas. 1917 C. 605; Oldham v. People, 61 Colo. 413,
158 Pac. 148; Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 5 77, 2 South.
854, 60 Am. Rep. 193; State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 9
Am. Rep. 242; State v. Keer!, 29 Mont. 508, 75 Pac.
362, 101 Am. St. Rep. 579; Hotema v. United States,
186 U.S. 413, 22 Sup. Ct. 895, 46 L.Ed 1225. See notr,
L.R.A. 1917F, 646."
It is apparent, therefore, that the instructions as requested by the appellant on hallucinations, had they been
given, would have imposed a greater burden on the part of
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the appellant than those given by the court and, hence, the
appellant could in no way have been prejudiced.
(c) As noted above, the majority of the courts do not
fa\·or instructions on delusions and hallucinations. In fact,
the instructions as requested by the appellant are contrary
to the better reasoned cases. W eihofen, Insanity as a Def1 nsc in Criminal Law, Chap. 3, Sec. 1; Perkins, Criminal
Law, page 751; Kraus v. State, supra. Further, it is questionable whether an individual under hallucinations can
properly report his own hallucinations. Thus, in Jaspers,
General Psychopathology ( 1963), it is observed:
"If we try to get some closer understanding of these
primary experiences of delusion, we soon find we cannot really appreciate these quite alien modes of experience. They remain largely incomprehensible, unreal and beyond our understanding.Yet some attempts
ha\·e been made. We find that there arise in the patient
certain primary sensations, vital feelings, moods,
a\\·arenesses: 'Something is going on; do tell me what
on earth is going on', as one patient of Sandberg said
to her husband. When he asked what she thought was
going on, the patient said, 'How do I know, but I'm
certain something is going on.' "

Further, the form of delusions or hallucinations may vary
substantially from false perceptions to splitting of perception, to actual delusional ideas, perceptions and awarenesses. Jaspers, supra, page 60 through 104. Consequently,
it is apparent that the better reasoned cases and those more
compatible with full use of medical knowledge would
merely give the jury the general test of criminal responsibility and not confuse the jury with obsolete legal standards
which may be in conflict with the psychiatric testimony
given.
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It is submitted, therefore, that this court should acknowledge that where the proper Af'Naghten plus irresistible impulse test is given that no other instructions should be given
even though hallucinations or delusions are involved.
Most recently in Brady v. Attorney General for Northern
Ireland, [1963] Appeals Cases 386, the House of Lords, in
considering an appeal from the Court of Appeals from
Northern Ireland, considered the question of whether the
trial court had erred in not giving instructions on automatism along with those on insanity. The court ruled that
where the nature of the actions raised an issue of insanity,
the instructions on insanity would be adequate to cover the
defense on all grounds. The court was of the opinion that if
the actions of the defendant arose from a mental disease,
no special instruction on automatism was required.
It is apparent that, applying the reasoning of the Roust
of Lords to the facts of this case, no claim of instructional
error can be sustained.
( d) The instructions requested by the appellant, assuming that he was entitled to the instructions given, were not
properly drawn and, therefore, the court could refuse to
give them. Instruction No. 2 does not apprise the jury that
the insane delusion must either prevent the defendant from
appreciating the nature and quality of his act, or knowing
right from wrong, or adhering to the right. The instruction,
therefore, standing alone, is meaningless without somehow
being tied in with one of the above elements. Further, the
instruction is extremely ambiguous and badly drafted so
that it could only be confusing to the jury. Under these
circumstances, it is well within the province of the court to
reject the instructions. In Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice,
4th Ed., Sec. 663, it is stated:

19
"The court may reject a requested instruction which
docs not find support in the evidence, or which is not
correct as a matter of law, even though modification
or explanation would remove the defects, and make it
applicable to the case.
Instructions 7 and 2 fail to advise the jury that where the
delusional rule is applicable, it must appear that the delusion was the cause of the act committed. The insane delusion must be related to the crime committed and be a delusion with respect to the circumstances surrounding that
crime. Clark and Marshall, Crimes, 6th Ed., Sec. 6.02.
Neither of these instructions properly related the hallucination or delusion to that requirement, assuming that such an
instruction is ever proper.
Further, Instruction 11, which also has the defects mentioned as to Instructions 2 and 7, is simply not a correct
statement of the law. Provocation is immaterial in an
hallucinatory or delusionary instruction unless the provocation would justify a defense to the crime. Further, this instruction is argumentative.
It is apparent, therefore, that since the instructions were
not properly couched in terms of the rule of law that appellant sought the court to present to the jury, the trial court
committed no error in rejecting the instructions.
(e) It is submitted that the evidence in the instant case
was of such a nature as not to justify an instruction on
delusions or hallucinations, assuming that the court feels
that there is any validity to such principle as it relates to the
law of insanity.
The testimony of the appellant while on the stand raised
nothing concerning hallucinations or delusions. The appellant merely indicated he could not remember anything
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from the time he turned off the light the second time until
he turned it on and saw that the victim had been stabbed
(R.266).
Further, at the time the appellant gave his statement to
the police, he expressly indicated that he did not believe
there were others in the room ( R. 512) and indicated that
he believed that he had stabbed the victim ( R. 513). The
only evidence at all indicative of hallucinations is the oral
statement of Officer Cahoon that the appellant had said
that he had stabbed some "individuals" ( R. 518). Based
upon that statement, Dr. Robert Mohr testified that possibly the appellant \\"aS participating in the delusions which
the victim Kenny Vaught was apparently having. However,
the appellant could not say what his delusions were or even
remember if he had them. There was, therefore, no predicate upon which to claim that he was under such a delusion
that, had the delusion been true, it would have been a
defense. The substance of the hallucination or delusion was
locked up by the appellant's convenient amnesia.
In State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177 ( 1931), th~
court felt that such limited evidence did not warrant an
instruction on hallucinations. It observed:
"* * * The only suggestion that his mind was so
affected is his statement to the peace officers that when
James Green arose from his chair he thought he heard
something rattle or snap and he thought James Gree~
had a gun in his pocket. Obviously, that statement is
not evidence that the appellant's mind was afff'.etcd
with delusions or hallucinations. What the defendant
thought may or may not be true, and, even if it were
true, the defendant did not claim in his statement to
peace officers, so far as appears, that he believed James
Green was about to injure him. Upon this record the
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defendant was not entitled to have the jury instructed
on the law as applied to delusions or hallucinations."
In United States u. Lopez-~M alaue, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 341,
15 C.l\I.R. 341 ( 1954), the Court of Military Appeals
ruled that amnesia, standing by itself, was not a sufficient
issuc to submit the question of insanity to the court. In the
instant case amnesia was about all the defendant could
claim and the court still instructed on insanity. Under such
circumstances, it can hardly be claimed that the appellant
was entitled to an additional instruction on hallucinations
and delusions.
A case similar to the instant one, United States u. Olvera,
4 U.S.C.l\I.A. 134, 15 C.l\J.R. 134 ( 1954), involved a case
11 here the accused was found guilty of an assault whereby
g1nious bodily harm was intentionally afflicted. The evidence showed that the accused had been drinking prior to
the incident and had engaged in a scuffle with the victim
11 here the victim got stabbed. The appellant's only recount
of the incident \\·as that he remembered being in the presence of the victim before the crime was committed and then
immediately after the stabbing found himself standing with
a knife in his hand and observed the victim oozing blood.
A doctor testified that it was possible for the appellant to
have received a blow on the head which could produce
amnesia. Under these facts, which bear a very similar relationship to those now before the court, the Court of Military Appeals ruled that there was no requirement to instruct
upon the defense of insanity. The court said that amnesia
plus intoxication in nowise equates to an issue of legal insanity and that amnesia in and of itself is a neutral circumstancc.
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In the instant case, where the only evidence shows amnesia and unspecified possibilities of some hallucination due
to an unknown degree of intoxication produced by toluene
and where the appellant himself on the stand refuses to
acknowledge any hallucinations, and previously has stated
that he did not believe the hallucinations the victim was
suffering, it is apparent that there is insufficient evidence
to submit the matter to the jury.4
Based upon all of the arguments above stated, it is submitted that the trial court did not err in refusing to give
appellant's Instructions 2, 7 and 11. 5
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR I:'\
REFUSING TO GIVE APPELLANTS INSTRUCTIONS Oi\
VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER.

The appellant requested the trial court to instruct the
jury on the alleged lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter which the court refused to do (R. 31). The appellant contends that this failure was error. It is well settled
'In Moore v. D. & R.G.W. Rr., 4 U.2d 255, 292 P.2d 849 (1956), this
court observed that where medical testimony remained in the realm of possi·
bilities, it was insufficient to warrant jury consideration. In the instant case.
where the defendant at least had the burden of going forward with proof to
justify his affirmative defense and where the evidence is both speculative and
uncertain and, in fact, unrelated to the legal principle involved, it can hardly
be said that the trial court abused its discretion in not submitting the matter of
hallucinations and delusions to the jury where they were otherwise instructed
on the defense of insanity and given clear instructions on the requirement of
finding an intent.
•The State concedes for the purposes of this case that the voluntary use.of
drugs which produces some mental derangement may be the basis for an in·
sanity defense since the court, in fact, instructed on that defense. However, the
State does not concede that in future cases such action would allow the lfl·
vocation of a defense of insanity. Cases from other jurisdictions appear W say
that intoxication from alcohol and drugs is not such a "disease of the mind d
as will justify an insanity instruction. People v. Alexander, 182 Cal.App.:!
281, 6 Cal. Rep. 153 ( 1960). It should be submitted that such act10n is ,not
the type of "mental disease" that gives rise to the insanity plea. See Hall; G~.n
eral Principles of Criminal Law, 2d Ed. ( 1960) ; U.S. v. Hurt (D.C. Cir.
1965), as yet unreported (narcotic addiction).
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in this jurisdiction that the court need not give an instruction on a lesser included offense unless it is clearly raised by
the e\ idence. Thus, in State v. Angle, 61 Utah 432, 215
Pac. 5'.~ 1 ( 1923), it was stated:
"It is a \\·ell-settled rule that instructions as to lower
grades of the offenses charged should be given when
\\·arranted by the evidence. It is equally well settled
that in a criminal prosecution error canot be predicated on the omission of the trial court to instruct as to
lesser grades of the offense charged where there is no
c\'ickncc to reduce the offense to a lesser grade. 1
Blashficlcl, Instructions to Juries (2d Ed.) § 408."

Sec also State v. Mitchell, 3 U.2cl 70, 278 P.2d 618 ( 1955).
In the instant case, it is apparent that there was no evidence before the jury upon which they could find the elements of manslaughter. Section 76-30-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, defines voluntary manslaughter as being the
killing of a human being without malice. Section 76--30'i ( 1) acids the following clements:
"Voluntary, upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat
of passion."

In State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 ( 1963), this
court observed as to the definition, "This statutory definition is but declaratory of the common law." The court was
manifestly correct in its conclusion. Clark and Marshall,
Crimes, 6th Ed., Section 10.11; Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law, 18th Ed. ( 1962) Section 6. It is well established
that if the circumstances show the killer acts not in the heat
of blood but from malice, that no issue of manslaughter is
raised. Clark and ~Iarshall, supra, pages 620-621; 1
IL111 kins, Pleas of the Crown, Chap. 11, Para. 18. Additionally, in People z•. Calton, 5 Utah 451, 16 Pac. 902
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( 1888), this court upheld an instruction on \'Oluntary manslaughter which advised the jury that to reduce homicidr
to manslaughter on the grounds of passion or sudden quarrel, the provocation must be such that would give rise to an
irresistible passion in the mind of a reasonable person. See
also Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law, 18th Ed. ( 1962),
p. 165. At common law, this provocation arose in four circumstances :
1. Violent assault.
2. Unlawful arrest.
3. A killing in mutual combat, provided no unfair
advantages taken.
4. A killing by the husband of the wife's paramour
upon the discovery of adultery.
(Clark and Marshall, supra, page 619.)

In the instant case, the killing occurred in none of these
circumstances. The appellant did not testify that there was
any sudden quarrel or heat of passion that caused him to
kill the deceased. Further, none of the common law provocations which will reduce a higher degree of murder to a
lesser degree are present. Under these circumstances, the
court was correct in refusing the instruction on voluntary
manslaughter. See also State v. Mitchell, supra, where the
court noted that it was proper to have refused the apprllant's request for an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.
In State v. Gallegos, 16 U.2d 192, 396 P.2d 414 (1964),
the appellants argue that they were prejudiced on an
erroneous instruction on voluntary manslaughter. The
court noted that not only does voluntary manslaughter require a specific intent but that it must be shown that the
killing was committed as a result of a quarrel or under the
heat of passion under circumstances which would provoke
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a reasonable man. The court held that no error could be
claimed from the erroneous instruction given where the
c\'idence did not show that the killing arose out of any
quarrel or heat of passion. Consequently, under the facts
ancl circumstances of the instant case, it cannot be contenclecl that the instruction on voluntary slaughter was
propn.
The appellant relies upon the case of State u. Green,
'upra. for the proposition that a manslaughter instruction
11 oulcl be proper. It is admitted that the Green case pro\'icles that where the mental condition of the accused is such
that he cannot form the requisite intent, it may reduce the
crimc of murder in the first degree to that of manslaughter.
Ho11·e-cr, this case relates to the defense of partial responsibilitv. Even so, the case notes that the killing must occur
under the common law circumstances. Thus, the court
noted:

"If appellant killed the deceased in the heat of passion and 11·ithout malice, he may be guilty of voluntary
manslaughter, provided, of course, that he was legally
responsible."
The court went on to note that there was sufficient evidence
that the killing occurred in the heat of passion. It is assumed
that the killing also occurred under circumstances that
would be within the common law excuses which would
justify a person acting in such a manner under the heat of
passion.
It should be noted, however, that the Green case is absolutely erroneous in its analysis of the impact of mental
discasc short of insanity. If there is an impairment such
that thc accused cannot form the requisite intent, then the
proper i11struction is a lesser included offense where intent
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is not required. There is no question but \\'hat intent is required in the crime of manslaughter. State v. Gallegos,
supra, and cases cited therein. Manslaughter and second
degree murder, therefore, require the same intent. The difference between the crimes is that manslaughter arises out
of the heat of passion or quarrel which would justify the
action of a reasonable person. Therefore, an appropriate
instruction \\'Ould not be on voluntary manslaughter, but
rather on involuntary manslaughter where intent is not
required. No instruction on involuntary manslaughter was
requested.
It is apparent, that the trial court acted properly in refusing an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.
Further, the State submits that the concept of partial
insanity which says that an individual can be sane but still
not have the requisite intent is scientifically erroneous. It
should be noted that the English courts recognize the concept not based on any theory as absurd as saying that a person can be sane but still lack the mental ability to intend.
but rather on the grounds that equity may warrant relieving
a person from the severity of a first degree murder sentence
if, though legally sane, he suffers from some form of mental
disease that could have in some way affected his actions.
Williams, Criminal Law, 2d Ed., The General Part, Sec
172, 173. In England, it is called "diminished responsibility" and is a matter, not of judicial interpretation, but
legislative enactment (Homicide Act 195 7). Many courts
and authorities reject the doctrine of partial responsibility
on the grounds that it is impossible to compartmentalize
a person's mind and say that he could understand the nature
of the act, adhere to the right, and understand that what he
was doing was wrong, but not form the requisite intent.
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Fisher l'. United States, 328 U.S. 463 ( 1946). Commonwealth v. Heidler, 191 Pa. 375, 43 A. 211, states:

"To say that a man is insane to an extent which incapacitates him from fully forming an intent to take
life, yet enables him to fully and maliciously form an
intent to do great bodily harm without a purpose to
take life, is absurd, for the one involves the same test
of responsibility as the other, the ability to distinguish
between right and wrong."

Sec also W eihofcn and Overholser, .Mental Disorder Afjecting the Degree of a Crime, 56 Yale Law Journal 959, 978;
43 Cornell Law Quarterly 283 ( 195 7). Based on what is
noted above, it is submitted that the very basis of the Green
opinion for partial responsibility is erroneous.
Finally, as noted, what the Green case involves is the
throry of partial responsibility but the appellant did not
request an instruction on that grounds. No instruction was
gi\'en to the jury or requested which would advise the jury
that if they found the accused was suffering from some
mental disorder short of insanity, they could consider it, to
the extent that it affected his ability to form the required
intrnt in committing the crime. Obviously, therefore, there
i~ disparity between the appellant's position on appeal and
that at the time of trial. The Green case might support a
proposition for partial insanity reducing a murder in the
first degree to manslaughter but, in the absence of a claim
for the doctrine of partial insanity and an instruction to the
jury, it is no authority for an instruction on manslaughter in
this case.
The appellant, having failed to raise the issue of partial
insanity, cannot for the first time on appeal claim the Green
case somehow required an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.

28
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JL'RY ON A LESSER!\!.
CLUDED OFFENSE OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER.

The appellant contends that the trial court committed
error in giving its instructions on the lesser crime of second
degree murder. The instruction as actually given by thr
court reads as follows: (Instruction No. 5, R. 44.)
"Before you can find the defendant guilty of murder
in the second degree, you must believe from the e\'idence in this case and beyond a reasonable doubt the
following:
1. That on or about the 28th day of May, 1964.
at Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant Ray
Wayne Pierce killed Kenneth Jack Vaught;
2. That the killing was with malice aforethought;
3. That when the defendant struck with the fatal
knife he had a specific design or intention, thought out
beforehand, to cause great bodily injury to the deceased, or an intention or design thought out beforehand to do an act, knowing the reasonable and natural
consequences thereof would be likely to cause great
bodily injury to the deceased;
4. That the killing was unlawful;
5. That the said Kenneth Jack Vaught died within
a year and a day after the cause of death was administered.
The burden is upon the State to prove to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt that all of the
foregoing elements of the crime of murder in the
second degree are present in this case, and if the State
shall have failed to so satisfy your minds upon one or
more of the aforesaid elements, you cannot find the
defendant guilty of murder in the second degree.
If the State does prove each and every one of the
foregoing elements, as aforesaid, then and in that everit

1
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the State would be entitled to a verdict of guilty against
the defendant, as the evidence so indicates."
When the instruction is read as a whole, it is obvious
that the court neither commented on the evidence or in'tructed the jury that as a matter of fact the defendant
strnck the fatal blow that killed Kenneth Vaught. It is
ob\'ious that what the court in fact did is set forth each of
the clements necessary to pro\'e the crime of second degree
murder. The first charge requires the jury to find that the
defendant in fact killed Kenneth Vaught. The third in\truction merely requires the jury to find that he had the
proper intent at the time the killing took place. This is a
substantially different situation from that involved in the
case of State v. Green, supra, which the appellant relies on.
In the Green case the court instructed the jury that it was
not controverted that the defendant shot the deceased. 78
Ctah, at 589. There the jury was precluded from determining the fact of the killing itself. In the instant case the
instructions, when taken as a whole, clearly advise the jury
that the issues must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
and that they are the triers of the fact. The rest of Instruction ~o. 5 at the top of page 45 clearly requires the State
to prove each and every element.
It is well settled that instructions must be taken as a
ll'hole. State v. AfcCoy, 15 Utah 136, 49 Pac. 420 ( 1897);
State l'. Hendricks, 123 Utah 267, 258 P.2d 452; State v.
Ei•ans, 107 Utah 1, 151 P.2d 196. In State v. Siddoway,
61 Utah 189, 211 Pac. 968 ( 1922), this court noted:
"* * * \Vhen instructions as a whole fairly present the
law, clearly present the issues involved, and contain
no harmful or prejudicial errors, the verdict in a criminal case must stand. The statute that provides that
technical errors in criminal cases shall be disregarded

30
is mandatory, and, unless upon a review of all the f1idence we arc satisfied that a miscarriage of justice has
resulted, we have no right to interfere with the jury's
verdict. * * *"
It is apparent, therefore, that the allegation in the appellant's brief that the instruction as given precluded the
jury from weighing the fact of whether the appellant did
stab Kenny Vaught is without merit.
It is submitted that in any event the appellant is in no
position to complain, since no exception was taken to thf
court's instruction on that basis. The record reflects that
the only exception taken to Instruction No. 5 by the appellant was a claim that it was error to only instruct upon the
intention to inflict bodily harm ( R. 500). It is submitted,
therefore, that since the appellant did not take exception
to the instruction given, he may not complain of any error
in this case.
It is well established that before an appellant may claim
error in the instructions given by the trial court, exceptions
must be taken, 77-37-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953;
State v. Anderson, 75 Utah 496, 286 Pac. 645; State v.
Cooper, 114 Utah 517, 207 P.2d 764 ( 1949); State v. Cobo,
90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952. Most recently, in State v. Smith,
401 P.2d 445 (Utah 1965), this court noted that in thr
absence of an objection, errors will normally not be re·
viewed on appeal.
Since the appellant failed to take appropriate exceptions
and the error, if any, is at best doubtful, there is no basis for
reversal.
Finally, it is submitted that the instruction given by the
court could in no way be prejudicial. Section 77-42-1,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides:

1
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"After hearing an appeal the court must give judgment without regard to errors or defects which do not
affect the substantial rights of the parties. If error has
been committed, it shall not be presumed to have resulted in prejudice. The court must be satisfied that it
has that effect before it is warranted in reversing the
judgment."
In State v. La nos, 63 Utah 151, 223 Pac. 1065, this court
ruled that remarks of the judge, which might have been
construed to mean that it was not necessary to prove that
the defendant knew that the check which was the subject
of the action was forged, did not require reversal in the
absence of a showing of clear prejudice and where other
facts and circumstances indicated the jurors were aware of
their prerogatives. See also State v. Peterson, 121 Utah 229,
240 P.2d 504, and State v. Hines, 6 U.2d 126, 307 P.2d 887. 6
The facts in the instant case show that the appellant,
immediately after commission of the crime, stated that he
"killed" or "stabbed" the deceased ( R. 117, 122, 154). The
n·iclcnce did not disclose any other person in the room with
the appellant at the time the stabbing occurred. The appellant's knife was the obvious murder weapon. In his statement to the police, which appears to have been admitted in
evidence as part of the appellant's testimony, the appellant
expressly stated, in response to the question as to whether he
believed he stabbed the deceased ( R. 513) :

"Q. Do you believe you stabbed him?

A. Yes."
Additionally, the whole plea of the appellant appears to
have been one of insanity. At one part in the trial, appellant's counsel expressly asked a question of a witness which
"l\.,th of these cases also stand for the proposition that the failure to take

"ill'' upriate exceptions "ill preclude a claim of error on appeal.
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question affirmatively stated facts that the appellant had
done the stabbing ( R. 340). Further, the appellant on the
stand acknowledged that he had told the police that he
believed he had stabbed the deceased and acknowledged
that it was the truth (R. 299). The argument of appellant
in summation assumed that the appellant had killed the
deceased, and argued, however, that the appellant was not
sane, and could not form the required intent. Thus, the total
posture of the case was such that the appellant could in no
way have been prejudiced by the slight reference to the trial
court's instruction, which is now claimed as error on appeal.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS ON INTOXICA·
TION DO NOT REQUIRE REVERSAL.

The appellant contends that the trial court committed
error in instructing the jury on the effect of intoxication on
the appellant's criminality. The only portion of the instruction assailed by the appellant is that which states that intoxication not only does not make a criminal act any the less
criminal but may be a factor in aggravation.
At the outset it should be noted that the appellant has
not indicated how this could conceivably have prejudiced
him. The court instructed only on the crimes of first and
second degree murder. The jury convicted on the lesser
included offense. Consequently, the accused was given the
benefit of the doubt by the jury. Further, it is generally held ,
that intoxication, which is of course relevant in a charge of
first degree murder to the elements of premeditation,
malice, and intent, State v. Stenback, 78 Utah 350, 2 P.2d
1050 ( 1931); State v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 Pac.
1071; Hopt v. Utah, 104 U.S. 631 ( 1881); will not reduce
criminal culpability to manslaughter. Second degree mur-
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clrr is the lowest degree of criminality to which intoxication
11ill normally reduce a charge of first degree murder. In
12 A.LR. 888, it is stated:

"The rule in this country has, however, been modified in very few states, and the great weight of authority is that intoxication will not reduce a homicide
from murder to manslaughter."
In 79 A.LR. 904, it is observed:

"The great weight of authority, it is pointed out in
the earlier annotation, is that intoxication will not
reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter."
Since the jury in the instant case found the appellant
guilty of the lowest degree of murder upon which they were
instructed, it cannot be said that the appellant was prejudiced by the instruction that voluntary intoxication may be
an aggravating factor. Further, it is apparent that the
instruction as given clearly apprised the jury that they could
consider intoxication in determining the accused's ability to
premeditate or form the required intent. The instruction
as given left no doubt in the jury's mind as to the effect of
intoxication. The statement as to aggravation would only
have been relevant had the jury found that intoxication had
no effect upon the appellant's ability to premeditate or to
form the required intent. Clearly, therefore, the instruction as given could hardly be claimed to have deprived the
appellant of his defense of intoxication.
To the extent that the trial court instructed the jury that
intoxication may be an aggravating factor, it did no more
than restate the common law rule. First, it is well settled
that intoxication in and of itself is no defense to a prosecution for homicide, 12 A.LR. 869. Its relevancy is only on
the question of premeditation, malice, and intent. At com-
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mon law, it was generally stated that intoxication could
have an aggravating effect upon the crime. Thus, in 15 Am.
Jur., Criminal Law, Sec. 338, it is stated:
"At common law it is held that drunkenness not onh
docs not palliate the offense, but is an aggravation of
the wrong committed."
That this was the general accepted principal at common
law appears in substantial authority; Director of Public
Prosecutions v. Beard (1920), A.C. 479, 12 A.L.R. 846:
12 A.L.R. 866; Blackburn v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 638.
255 S.W. 99 ( 1923) ; 3 Coke, Institutes 46; Hale's Pleas nl
the Crown, Vol. 1, p. 32; Blackstone, Commentaries, Bonk
4, Chapter 2, Sec. 3; Singh, History of the Defense 11!
Drunkenness in English Criminal Law, 49 L.Q. Rev ..5l0
( 1933). In People v. Rogers, 18 N.Y. 9 ( 1858), the l\c11
York court early noted that a person who voluntarily intoxi·
cates himself to such an extent that it results in the com·
mission of crime certainly is morally indifferent to the righb
of other citizens and, therefore, blameworthy. In Pcop/1
v. Roberts, 19 Mich. 408 ( 1870), it is observed:
"He must be held to have purposely blinded hi'
moral perceptions, and set his will free from the con·
trol of reason - to have suppressed the guards and
invited the mutiny; and should therefore be held re·
sponsible as well for the vicious excesses of the 11il~
thus set free, as for the acts clone by its prompting.
Thus, there is substantial early precedent for the exact
proposition the court presented to the jury. It is, of course.
recognized that a number of cases take the position that
drunkenness in and of itself is a neutral fact which docs not
necessarily aggravate the crime. Clark and Marshall.
Crimes, 6th Ed., Sec. 6.09, p. 386. In view of this latter

1
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precedent, \\'hich seems to be the more modem view, it may
be the better practice not to refer to the question of aggra\ation, since, as a practical matter, it is meaningless. HowC\Cr, it is obvious that in the context of this case, and when
\irn eel as against the instruction given as a whole, it was not
prejudicial.
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CONCLUSION
The jury in the instant case heard a substantial amount
of testimony, both pro and con, relating to the criminal responsibility of the appellant. They had full opportunity to
observe the witnesses, the appellant himself, and to judge
the facts surrounding the commission of the crime. In doing
so, they apparently determined that the appellant was not
guilty of murder in the first degree, but that he had suffi.
cient responsibility and should be held chargeable for mur·
der in the second degree. When examining the record asa
whole, it cannot be doubted but that substantial justice was
done. The instructional errors complained of by the appel·
!ant have no legal merit. Some of the claims now raised on
appeal were so insignificant at trial as not to provoke objection or to warrant the appellant in advocating that posi·
tion. Further, the evidence in support of the claims of
instructional error hardly gives substance to the appellant's
position. The overwhelming weight of legal precedent
shows a firm and substantial basis for the trial court's in·
structions and strongly supports the respondent's position
that there is no basis to reverse the instant decision. Th~
court should affirm.
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